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Abstract. One of the most critical security protocol problems for hu-
mans is when you are betraying a trust, perhaps for some higher purpose,
and the world can turn against you if you’re caught. In this short paper,
we report on efforts to enable whistleblowers to leak sensitive documents
to journalists more safely. Following a survey of cases where whistle-
blowers were discovered due to operational or technological issues, we
propose a game-theoretic model capturing the power dynamics involved
in whistleblowing. We find that the whistleblower is often at the mercy
of motivations and abilities of others. We identify specific areas where
technology may be used to mitigate the whistleblower’s risk. However
we warn against technical solutionism: the main constraints are often
institutional.
1 Introduction
Whistleblowing is the act of exposing information relating to activities within
an organization that are unethical, illegal or “wrong”. Many believe that it is
necessary for a healthy society that there be means by which a whistleblower
can expose wrongdoing. The whistleblowing sections of government department
websites reveal an interesting dissonance: they acknowledge the necessity of leak-
ing [8,18,13], and some go as far as to offer rewards to whistleblowers [7]. Many
organizations have dedicated departments for receiving complaints, as well as
policies for whistleblower protection; this extends to private firms as well.
However, time and again such internal protection mechanisms have been
found lacking. A systemic failure is unsurprising, because managers do not want
their failings exposed, or even to know uncomfortable facts.
Thus, as a practical matter, whistleblowers may have to leak information to
external agencies such as industry regulators, the police or news organizations if
they want to force reform. Telling recent examples include the Chinese medics
who tried to warn the world of the COVID-19 epidemic while the political lead-
ership was still in denial, and the many women challenging sexual harrassment
in workplaces from Hollywood to Silicon Valley. A more controversial change
maker was Edward Snowden. After years in which internal complaints about
unlawful surveillance fell on deaf ears within the NSA and even resulted in FBI
action against complainants such as Bill Binney, Ed Snowden released classified
information to the world media to prove that senior officials had lied to Congress
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about the legality of the NSA’s operations. This resulted in President Obama
setting up the NSA review group, leading to reforms in how the US intelligence
community operates.
Following his disclosures, many media organisations set up supposedly secure
means of making contact, using mechanisms such as PGP, Signal and Secure
Drop. But do they actually work? We reviewed the advice given by a number
of newspapers to potential users of their private contact mechanisms and found
them to be lacking – indeed hazardous. We set out to find a better technological
solution, but soon realised we were missing the forest for the trees. Technology
plays a small part in a much larger game. A review of case studies taught us that
whistleblowing is really about power dynamics. In this paper, we explain what
these dynamics look like and present a game-theoretic model of the relevant
power relations. This leads us to present some ideas for future research.
2 Case Studies
Although we looked at a wide range of case studies, we’d like to highlight a
selection here to succinctly illustrate a range of scenarios. In the following section
we will analyse them and see how they fit into a security game. Then we estimate
weights for the different power relations and arrive at an equilibrium for each of
the case studies.
2.1 Soft and Hard Power
First, a note about the taxonomy of power. Power is commonly seen as either
soft power and hard power. Hard power is the ability to coerce, and can be based
on one or more of a variety of tools: legal, financial, military, even physical in-
timidation. Soft power is the ability to co-opt and persuade, and its mechanisms
are largely social including the credibility of a person, institution or country,
public support for ideas more generally, prejudices such as sexism and racism,
and even cults of personality [16]. We will use these terms as we discuss power
dynamics in the following sections.
2.2 Edward Snowden
Edward Snowden was a contractor working for the NSA who blew the whistle on
the NSA’s mass data collection programs after Director of National Intelligence
James Clapper lied to Congress about unlawful intelligence collection against
US citizens. As an NSA (and former CIA) insider, Snowden understood the
technolgies that would be needed to communicate securely with a journalist
at a distance. He first got in touch with the journalist Glenn Greenwald, but
Greenwald found encrypted email too annoying to use. This led Snowden to
contact another journalist, Laura Poitras, who got Greenwald on board.
The Snowden case is interesting because it pits the whistleblower against one
of the strongest adversaries, and because Snowden’s knowledge of surveillance
enabled him to disclose his identity on his own terms. But interesting as this
case is, it represents a tiny minority of whistleblowing situations. Usually the
adversary is not the NSA but a medium-sized business or a public-sector body
such as a hospital; the whistleblower is not an expert in anonymity; and, crucially,
the anonymity set (the number of people who could feasibly be the whistleblower)
is not the tens of thousands of NSA technical staff, but a handful of people who
knew what was going on.
2.3 The PCAW case studies
To get a better sense of what a “typical” whistleblowing event looks like we went
through the case studies published by Public Concern At Work (PCAW) [19],
a UK-based whistleblowing charity. Their website lists a large number of cases
where employees exposed wrongdoing by their employers. In most such cases
the anonymity set – the set of people who knew the information – was small;
sometimes it was just one person. In such cases, anonymity technologies aren’t
going to be much help.
PCAW’s advice in these cases generally revolves around finding the right
authorities to talk to. Rarely do they recommend broadcasting the information
to the public at large or anonymously leaking documents to a journalist. Where
there are competent authorities that can keep the wrongdoer in check, this ap-
proach can make sense. A bank that’s ripping off its customers can be reported
to the regulator, and junior medics could deal with an incompetent surgeon in
the same way. However, this often doesn’t work out in practice. In the case of
UK banks, the mis-selling of payment protection insurance grew into a major
abuse before regulators stepped in, leading to compensation in the multiple bil-
lions; and one incompetent breast surgeon subjected more than 1,000 patients to
unnecessary and damaging operations over 14 years before he was stopped [4].
PCAW’s advice ignores the soft power that the adversary may have or be
able to enlist. The whistleblower may face social ostracism, difficulties in contin-
uing work in a sector or intimidation by colluding actors. These repercussions
are hard to predict and can have a severe impact. And the adverse reaction
does not have to come from line managers; low-level employees can also pick on
whistleblowers if they believe they have management’s tacit support. In one em-
ployment tribunal case, a female employee of a Scottish government department
was found gagged and tied up after complaining about sexism [5]. It can also be
industry-wide. For example, the UK construction industry kept a secret blacklist
of over 3,000 ‘undesirables’ including union activists, whistleblowers and people
who had raised health and safety concerns; over 40 firms paid £3,000 a year each
to subscribe to the service. It was raided by the UK authorities and its oper-
ator prosecuted. It later turned out to have the covert support of the Security
Service [23].
2.4 Harvey Weinstein
Another case where the effects of soft power are apparent is that of Harvey
Weinstein, a Hollywood director who gained notoriety in 2017 when dozens of
women accused him of pedatory sexual behaviour, indecent assault and rape [24].
These accusations kicked off the #MeToo movement in which a number of other
rich or powerful men were publicly accused of sexual misconduct.
For years, there had been rumours about Weinstein’s inappropriate behaviour,
with some celebrities advising women in Hollywood to not go to his private par-
ties [2]. But Weinstein’s victims rarely spoke out. This involved a mixture of
hard power (fear exclusion from work in Hollywood, fear of legal costs) and soft
power (the social stigma attaching to survivors of sexual assault). In 2017 the
New York Times broke the story that he’d paid off at least eight women after
some thirty years of allegations of sexual harassment [11]. This opened the flood-
gates. Dozens more women felt legally and socially safe enough to come out and
make allegations of rape or indecent assault against Weinstein; and hundreds
more came forward to make allegations against a range of public figures includ-
ing Prince Andrew and President Donald Trump. The key to whistleblowing on
misogyny and sexual abuse in the workplace was not a new encryption technol-
ogy. It was a shift in soft power that gave victims and witnesses the confidence
to tell their stories in the knowledge that they had some chance of being taken
seriously rather than being crushed or just ignored.
3 Related Work
There is no shortage of whistleblowing laws, organizational guidelines, and in-
ternal complaints procedures. Most of them appear aimed at damage limitation.
The formal complaints procedure at the typical company will lead to the human
resources department, which exists to protect the company. The usual outcome,
as in Weinstein’s career up to October 2017, is that complainants are intimidated
into leaving and perhaps paid off.
We leave consideration of such laws and procedures to one side for now,
until we have a better understanding of the power dynamics and the possible
solutions. For now we focus on whistleblowing to news agencies by individuals
who thereby place themselves at risk of being sued or prosecuted.
3.1 Academic work
Academic work on whistleblowing in the security community has focused on
the usability of encryption software products [25], the design of secure messag-
ing systems [6] and so on. These tools can significantly cut the risk of leaking
documents where the leaker is in a large anonymity set and the opponent is
technically capable. However our focus is on how to minimise the overall risk
rather on the specifics of the tools used.
3.2 Journalistic resources
Dozens of news organisations have web pages with guides on how to leak doc-
uments to them; see for example the New York Times [17] and WikiLeaks [26].
However, they focus more on describing what makes a particular tip good and
listing the acceptable communications channels, rather than on how to avoid
catastrophic mistakes. For example, such pages do not provide adequate ex-
planations of how information can leak through side channels, how to transfer
physical evidence safely into digital formats, or more generally the capabilities
of potential adversaries. None of them appears to help potential whistleblowers
figure out what their anonymity set is and how they might expand that.
To illustrate these shortcomings, consider the guidelines published by the
New York Times. Their web page has links to Instructions and Security, and
suggests four channels: WhatsApp, Signal, physical post and email.
The web page mentions that WhatsApp keeps ‘records of the phone num-
bers involved in the exchange and the users’ metadata, including timestamps on
messages’, but does not explain what metadata is, or how it can allow the FBI
to track the leaker. For Signal, the web page mentions that Signal saves only the
phone number and the time of last activity and states that no metadata about
the communication gets saved. This web page also fails to explain metadata and
how Signal has been compromised in the past. The new user is just not told
that the anonymity set of WhatsApp is much larger than that of Signal due to
its greater number of users, or how to work out whether this matters. It does
not spell out, for example ‘If you’re one of only six people with access to this
document it might not be wise to use Signal if none of the other five ever do’. It
would also have been prudent to explain that smartphone apps such as Signal
and Whatsapp may link the leak to a specific phone number, and that changing
your SIM card may not help if this is flagged as suspicious (whether by your
social circle or by a network adversary).
The New York Times alternatively suggests sending documents through email,
using PGP via the Mailvelope plug-in for Chrome and Firefox. The process for
encryption here exhibits similar properties to those that confused most users
in the canonical paper of security usability, ‘Why Johnny Can’t Encrypt’ [25].
Furthermore, DNS is widely monitored to detect malware and botnets, so DNS
access to a commonly-used plug-in for information leakage can flag up a machine
as suspicious, especially just after accessing The New York Times.
Finally, the last option proposed by the New York Times is to use physical
post. It recommends using a public mailbox, rather than a post office. It might
be a good idea to explain why: the US government scans all snail mail and
records sender and destination [9,14], and some letter destinations are more
closely monitored than others – presumably including the New York Times [15].
Other risks associated with sending documents through the mail might also be
discussed, including new methods for non-invasive content extraction [20]. Lastly,
printers themselves represent a vulnerability due identifying watermarks left on
documents [21] as well as difficult to clear on-device storage.
Another option mentioned fairly regularly on news organizations is Secure-
Drop, an application designed specifically for leaking documents. We performed
a cognitive walkthrough of this application and identified several usability issues.
We believe it would be challenging for a novice user to install the Tor browser,
navigate to onion links, and securely store the passphrase that SecureDrop re-
quires them to remember. In fact, using Tor itself can severely reduce a leaker’s
anonymity set against any adversary that can monitor their network activity.
4 Whistleblowing Game
This review taught us that there is no formal model of whistleblowing. In the
security literature, well-established “games” help shape the mental models of
researchers and system designers; all computer science students become familiar
with Alice, Bob and Eve playing games with encryption and authentication, and
with the Byzantine Generals’ Problem for consensus algorithms.
Perhaps the closest to a whistleblowing game is Simmons’ model for covert
communications [22], where Alice and Bob are in jail, and wish to plan an escape;
all their communications are monitored by the warden Willie, who will put them
in solitary confinement if he can find any evidence of covert communications. The
object of the game for Alice and Bob is to communicate in a way that leaves no
evidence of its existence, while for Willie it’s to prevent this [1].
In this section, we propose a whistleblowing game that models a more realistic
range of actors.
4.1 The Actors
The whistleblowing scenario is more elaborate than the covert communications
game:
1. Alice is the whistleblower;
2. Duncan is the reporter;
3. Max is the boss whose wrongdoing Alice wishes to expose;
4. Tom is an ally of Max;
5. Harry is an ally of Alice.
Our final stakeholder is “the World”, a final arbiter to which the documents
may be released. Let us look at the goals for each of these entities:
– Alice wants to broadcast information about Max to the World;
– Duncan wants to know that Alice is genuine and, if so, broadcast information
to the World;
– Max wants to stop Duncan from broadcasting this information;
– Alice wants to plausibly deny her involvement for as long as possible;
– Max wants to know who Alice is;
– Tom is an intimidator who can support Max with hard power;
– Harry is a regulator with hard power who wants to support Alice.
We suggest that a model of this size may be large enough to reflect real-world
tensions while being small enough to be tractable. It is clear what the flow of
information in this game looks like, and Figure 1 illustrates it.
The more complex interaction is that of power. Let us see what the flows of
power might look like.
Fig. 1. Information flow in the whistleblowing sequence. Entities in red are trying to
blow the whistle, entities in blue are their adversaries while the purple entities are
ambivalent.
5 Flows of power
Some insights become obvious once we start thinking of power imbalances. A
successful leak is only possible if Duncan, the reporter, can stand up to the
miscreant Max; if Duncan can be coerced the leak will not get out to the World,
and Alice’s cover may be blown too – if Duncan knows who she is and can be
forced to betray her. A second factor is the relative power of Tom and Harry. In
a state governed by the rule of law, we would expect that Harry, the regulator,
would be much more powerful than Tom, Max’s thug, at least in the long run;
while in a corrupt state the dictator’s henchmen may be able to treat Harry
with contempt. So, in a rule-of-law state, the leak may have some intrinsic soft
or hard power on its side. If the story is seen as “just” or its disclosure “legal”
then it could be harder for Max to coerce either Alice or Duncan. However, even
in wealthy developed countries, an injustice may persist for many years before
it catches the public’s attention. So any decision by Max as to whether to set
his thug Tom on Duncan, or on Alice directly, is likely to involve a calculation
of likely consequences.
Let’s look at this more closely with a game-theoretic model.
Figure 2 presents an extensive form of a stylised whistleblowing game. The
game has two players – Alice and Tom – and three agents whose strategies are
known in advance – Duncan, the World and Harry. In this setup, Tom is a
combination of Tom and Max from the previous section.
Alice moves first and has to decide whether she wants to leak the information
she has. If she does not, the game ends with both players getting a payoff of 0. If
she decides to leak, Alice goes to Duncan, who decides whether or not to trust
her. Duncan trusts Alice with a probability w known in advance to both Alice
and Tom. If he does not trust Alice, the game ends, again with corresponding
payoffs. If he does trust Alice, he broadcasts the information.
What happens next depends on how the World behaves. There are three
possibilities: (1) the world supports Tom with probability x, or (2) it supports
Duncan with probability y, or (3) it is neutral with probability 1− x− y. Tom
does not know in advance which course the World will take. We consider these
three cases in turn.
(1) The World supports Tom. In this case, the broadcast is in effect censored,
regardless of whether Tom spends resources to attempt censoring or not. Subse-
quently, Tom needs to decide whether to spend resources to de-anonymise Alice.
If he does, Alice ends up in jail, and otherwise she remains anonymous. Overall,
there are four possible outcomes here, as shown in the figure.
(2) The world supports Duncan. If the world supports Duncan, then the
broadcast is not censored, regardless of whether Tom spends resources to attempt
censorship. Then Harry comes into the picture and may protect Alice. With
probability z, Harry’s protection is strong , so that Alice ends up with impunity,
even if Tom tries to de-anonymise her. With probability (1 − z) his protection
is weak. In this case, if Tom goes after Alice, she ends up in jail. If Tom doesn’t
try, she remains free. Overall, there are eight possible outcomes here, each with
its respective payoffs for both players.
(3) The world is neutral. If the world is neutral, then the broadcast will be
censored if Tom spends resources to censor it, and not otherwise. If the broadcast
is censored, then Tom has to decide, as in (1), whether he wants to go after Alice.
If it is not censored, then Harry comes into the picture, as in (2), and we see six
possible outcomes as shown in the figure.
This game is solved by backward induction. Payoffs are weighted by relevant
probabilities to calculate expected payoffs for both players. Ultimately, Alice
decides whether she wants to leak, based on whether the expected payoff of the
leak for her is positive or not. The solution turns out to be straightforward if the
players are risk-neutral, but it can also be solved assuming both risk-aversion
and risk-seeking.
5.1 Subgame-perfect Equilibrium
First, let us specify what are the payoffs of outcomes for Tom and Alice, who
are the only two players of this game. These are as follows:
– Alice does not attempt to leak. both get 0;
– Duncan does not trust Alice. Alice gets a, Tom gets 0;
– If Duncan goes to Max for fact checking, then perhaps Max gets Tom to
censor Duncan before the broadcast goes out. Here Alice gets b, Tom gets
B;
– Duncan sends out a broadcast but it is quickly censored and Alice ends up
in jail. Alice gets c, Tom gets C;
– Broadcast is censored but Alice remains anonymous. Alice gets d, Tom gets
D;
– Broadcast is not censored and Alice remains anonymous. Alice gets e, Tom
gets E;
– Broadcast is not censored and Alice has impunity. Alice gets f , Tom gets F ;
– broadcast is not censored, but Alice ends up in jail. Alice gets g, Tom gets
G.
Throughout the game, Tom has an opportunity to try to censor the broadcast
and/or de-anonymise Alice. Tom is uncertain whether these attempts will be
successful, since the outcome depends on The World and Harry. Yet Tom knows
how much both attempts will cost him. In particular:
– An attempt at censorship costs Tom H;
– An attempt de-anonymise Alice costs him I.
Now, to the solution. For simplicity, assume risk-neutrality. Start with the
very last decision that Tom has to make – i.e. whether to de-anonymise Alice.
Assume that he will always try to do this if the expected utility is at least as
large as that of not doing so. Then, at nodes 7–9, he will try to de-anonymise
Alice if
C + I ≥ D
Next, nodes 4–6 involve uncertainty over Harry, who can be either support Alice
or not with a known probability. Here, Tom will only attempt to de-anonymise
Alice if
zG + (1− z)E + I ≥ F.
For both types of nodes, determine the preferred action for Tom and label the
corresponding expected utilities as E(Un), n ∈ [4, 9].
Move one step above, to node 3, where Tom has to decide whether he wants
to try to censor the broadcast. Again, he will attempt to do so if the expected
utility of censorship is at least as large as that of not doing so – i.e.
xE(U9) + (1− x− y)E(U7) + zE(U5) ≥ xE(U8) + (1− x− y)E(U6) + zE(U4).
Determine the preferred action for Tom, and record the expected value of this
action as E(U3).
Now move one step above to node 2. Tom will block Duncan if
B ≥ E(U3).
Determine Tom’s preferred action and label it as E(U2).
Finally, at node 1, Alice will compare her expected payoff of trying to leak
the information with the payoff of not attempting to leak, which we normalise
to 0. She expects that with probability 1−w Duncan will not trust her, in which
case she will receive a payoff of a; with probability w he will trust her, in which
case her payoff is determined by the actions of Tom as described above. She will
only try to leak if her expected payoff of leaking
(1− w)a + w ∗ E[as determined by Tom’s actions]
is positive.
Notice that this model can easily accommodate a case where Duncan goes
directly to Harry without first trying to broadcast with the support of the World.
Assuming that the broadcast will not be censored, if Harry is involved and the
World is not, this requires one to set the probability that the World will support
Duncan y = 1. Doing this essentially removes nodes 3(1) and 3(2) from the
picture as well as all subsequent nodes. A slightly more complex situation is
where Alice goes directly to Harry, ignoring both Duncan and the World. This
case requires a slight modification in the model in the following way. First, set
the probability that Duncan trusts Alice as w = 1. Next, Tom’s payoff when
attempting to overwhelm Duncan should be set to−∞. Finally, as in the previous
modification, we set y = 1. This will essentially remove Duncan and the World
from the setup entirely, and eliminate node (2) from the picture as well as nodes
3(1), 3(2) and all subsequent nodes. The solution method for these two modified
cases remain exactly the same as above – start from the final nodes and go up
the tree, at each node determining the preferred action for Alice/Tom.
5.2 Revisiting Case Studies
Let’s look at the case studies from Section 2 again through the lens of this model.
In the case of Snowden, we see that the World acted more or less in a neutral
fashion. (People in government mostly saw Snowden as a traitor while people
in the tech industry mostly saw him as a whistleblower.) Snowden’s adversary
had the power to de-anonymize him, but his Duncan had impunity thanks to
the US constitution and his Harry, the Russian government, was politically and
militarily strong enough to provide Snowden with personal impunity in the form
of asylum. We therefore end up with payoffs of g and GI for Snowden and Tom
respectively as shown in Figure 2.
We see the World acting in favour of Alice in the Weinstein case, after the New
York Times article triggered a shift in public opinion which changed sex abuse by
powerful men from being normal to being unacceptable. Then regardless of the
presence of a Tom, we would expect the information not to be censored. However,
before the World changed its opinion, Tom (in the form of the rich abuser’s
lawyers) could censor the information with threats of actions for defamation
and bills for legal costs. This is exactly what we saw happen in this case.
6 Recommendations and Future Work
This analysis suggests that if we wish to help whistleblowers, there are three
ways in which technology might be able to help:
1. Reducing time-to-publish to zero;
2. Increasing the cost of de-anonymising Alice;
3. Facilitating trust establishment between Alice and Duncan.
Variants of reducing the time-to-publish include reducing Duncan’s cost-
to-publish to zero, increasing his cost-to-betray, and eliminating Duncan com-
pletely. Which version you pick may depend on how you characterise “the World”.
When you write a tweet, are you publishing directly to the world or is Twitter
now your Duncan? But then there’s a further complicating factor, namely the
amount of influence you have and thus the likelihood that your tweet will go
viral.
Improving Alice’s anonymity has been the usual technical approach. As our
game shows, increasing her anonymity results in a higher cost for Tom to interfere
and thus increases the chances of a successful leak. Moreover, having a reliable
means to leak that is well known and easily available could foster a culture of
increased transparency [10]. This has the second-order effect of increasing Tom’s
costs in general.
But designers of media websites must be cognisant of the tiny anonymity sets
in which most whistleblowers find themselves. This means that bespoke whistle-
blowing systems may be of suspect utility. Physical intimidation and confiscation
of devices are a real possibility, and the mere existence of a leaking app on a per-
son’s device may be damning. After all, anonymity loves company, and it may be
more effective anyway to teach potential sources to use existing communications
tools with more effective operational security. If a newspaper wants sources to
use special software to leak, it should be embedded in every single copy of the
newspaper’s app.
Operationally, the most under-researched avenue of the three mentioned
above is the establishment of trust between Duncan and Alice. Not all leaks
are bona fide; in a world of increasingly authoritarian governments, news editors
must beware of bogus leakers, set up to discredit them. How is a reporter to tell
Alice from Malice? What sort of technology might help Duncan establish Al-
ice’s good faith without blowing her cover? In the traditional world, trust could
be established through mutual friends, or by showing organisational ID, or by
disclosing paper documents that would be hard to forge. Electronic equivalents
exist but often leave Duncan with digital evidence that might later be seized.
Careful use of existing resources can mitigate these risks. For example, Alice
might send a photo of her military ID to Duncan by Signal and set the message
to disappear after five minutes; that’s a decent online equivalent of meeting him
in a pub and showing him the real thing. However we see no discussion of such
issues on any of the web pages set up to encourage confidential sources to leak
to newspapers.
Finally, every introductory lecture on the Prisoners’ Dilemma points out that
if you don’t like the game you find yourself playing, you should try to change it
into a different one. Make the dilemma a multi-round game, and you can play
tit-for-tat. Can we change the game here?
A relevant case of whistleblowing in the computer industry is the disclosure
of software vulnerabilities. Until about 2004–5 this was a Prisoners’ Dilemma.
If a researcher took a vulnerability to a vendor they might just be threatened
with an expensive lawsuit and end up having to promise to keep quiet. The bug
meanwhile remained unfixed. So if you wanted to get bugs fixed, you had to take
the whistleblowing route and just publish bugs anonymously on bugtraq. That
was a lose-lose outcome for everyone, as you didn’t get the glory, and the vendor
then had to scramble to fix its product, which could get hacked meanwhile. The
solution was to change the game to responsible disclosure, whereby the discloser
gives the vendor a period of time to patch the vulnerability. Research in security
economics suggested this to be the best compromise [1].
Our own experience of reporting vulnerabilities is that responsible disclosure
to non-tech companies can still result in legal threats, and so our standard pro-
cedure when we discover a vulnerability in a payment system is no longer to
report it to the banks directly but rather to the banking regulators (the Fed, the
European Central Bank and the UK Financial Conduct Authority). This was
done for example with the vulnerabilities described in [12] and [3]. It removes
the threat of legal action against the security researcher, pushes the industry to
fix the problem, and with luck embeds compliance tests to ensure that it stays
fixed.
If Alice can go directly to Harry, then Duncan becomes redundant. And
where Harry’s incentives are strong, we often find workable mechanisms. For
example, many countries’ tax authorities have mechanisms for company staff to
blow the whistle on tax avoidance and in many cases to claim quite substantial
rewards. However not all industries are regulated well or at all, and even reg-
ulated industries have abuses in which their regulators take no interest. So it
might be of interest to study which of the world’s thousands of regulatory bod-
ies have serviceable whistleblowing mechanisms; this might give useful insights
into whether they are serious, or whether they see their real role as protecting
the industry they’re tasked to supervise. In the context of healthcare, to whom
should a concerned medic turn? March 2020 has seen large numbers of medics
writing to the press about issues such as the availability of personal protective
equipment because of lack of trust in the usual chain of command.
In short, whistleblowing is not just a problem of cryptographic protocol de-
sign, or even of usability engineering. It’s a complex and fascinating problem in
security economics which deserves study in its real-world context.
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Fig. 2. Sequential-move two-player whistleblowing game
